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problem, which already has been used in another state,' is a system that increases the state's role in monitoring and supplementally financing local educational expenditures. 16 2 It is suggested that
such a reform would account for the constitutional significance of
the right to education and would alleviate the practical difficulties
that the current financing scheme has failed to remedy.
Joanne Dantuono
DEVELOPMENTS IN

NEW YORK LAW

Juror conduct drawing upon "common sense and everyday experience" held not improper even though it includes outside observations material to issue in point at trial
Traditionally, evidence of the conduct and statements of a juror during the course of deliberations is not admissible to impeach
a duly rendered verdict. 63 This rule has yielded, however, whenN.Y.S.2d at 656-59 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d at
490-94, 518-19, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 617-18, 634; see also Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures, 57
CALIF. L. REv. 305, 316-17 (1969). Though the Nyquist Court seemingly recognized that
significant inequities exist in the current educational financing scheme, see 57 N.Y.2d at 38,
439 N.E.2d at 363, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 647-48, its decision may be attributable to the fact that
it has been the general "judicial practice to refuse to enter decrees" that would meet with
"excessive cost or risk of crisis" in their enforcement. Carrington, supra note 117, at 1252.
Furthermore, it has been noted that, with regard to equal protection attacks on propertybased educational funding schemes, "it would be difficult to imagine a case having a greater
potential impact on our federal system ... ." 411 U.S. at 44. Thus, it is suggested that the
Nyquist Court's application of the rational basis standard partially was based on its hesitancy to disrupt the status quo.
101 See infra note 162.
161 See Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 449, 467-68, 355 A.2d 129, 139 (1976). In Robinson,
the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a statutory public school
financing scheme that complied with the mandates of the education clause contained in the
state constitution. Id. at 458-68, 355 A.2d at 133-39. This funding system generally increased the state's role in public educational finance by permitting it to monitor local expenditures, detect inadequacies and, where necessary, either increase budgets beyond the
amounts locally determined or increase state aid to supplement insufficient local budgets.
Id. at 458-67, 355 A.2d at 133-38. Such a system grants broad discretionary power to the
commissioner and board of education. Id. It also entails individual consideration of the specific needs and circumstances existing in the various school districts. Id. Although this
scheme provides for flat state grants per pupil, the element of the New York system challenged in Nyquist, it does create an effective detection system to locate and remedy inadequacies in the functioning of these grants. Id.
lO' See McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 269 (1915); Vaise v. Delaval, 99 Eng. Rep. 944
(K.B. 1785). In Vaise, the rule excluding testimony of jurors that tends to impeach their
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ever an overt act of a juror has influenced the deliberations in such
a manner as to prejudice a criminal defendant's sixth amendment
rights. 1" A verdict may be overturned, for example, on the ground
own verdict was first recognized. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF

THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

§ 68,

at 148 n.80 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972); see 99 Eng. Rep. at 944. The court in Vaise concluded
that testimony relating to juror misconduct is admissible only when a third person observed
the particular conduct. Id. Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has stated that a
new trial may not be secured by using the testimony of jurors to impeach their own verdict.
McDonald v. PlesA, 238 U.S. at 269. In Dalrymple v. Williams, 63 N.Y. 361 (1875), the New
York Court of Appeals adopted the common-law rule, holding that affidavits "to show mistake or error of the jurors in respect to the merits, or irregularity or misconduct, or that
they mistook the effect of the verdict and intended something different" are not admissible.
Id. at 363. See generally E. FISCH, FISCH ON NEw YORK EVIDENCE § 305, at 204 (1977 &
Supp. 1981-82); C. MCCORMCK, supra, § 68, at 148; W. RICHARSON, EVIDENCE § 407, at 398400 (J. Prince 10th ed. 1973); Mueller, Jurors' Impeachment of Verdicts and Indictments
in Federal Court Under Rule 606(b), 57 NEB. L. REv. 920, 920-27 (1978).
The common-law doctrine prohibiting impeachment of a verdict through juror testimony relating to juror misconduct pervades the American judicial system, see 3 J. WmENSTEIN & M. BERGER, WmNSTmN's EVIDENCE § 606(03), at 22 (1981), and presently is embodied in rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, see FED. R. EvM. 606(b). Five policy
considerations have been advanced to account for the popularity of the common-law rule.
See Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 148 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 917 (1976). In Gereau,the court supported its preference for the common-law doctrine by observing that it "(1) discourag[es] harassment of jurors by losing parties eager to
have the verdict set aside; (2) encourag[es] free and open discussion among jurors; (3)
reduc[es] incentives for jury tampering; (4) promot[es] verdict finality; [and] (5) maintain[s]
the viability of the jury as a judicial decision-making body." Id. at 148; see McDonald v.
Pless, 238 U.S. at 267-68; People v. De Lucia, 20 N.Y.2d 275, 278, 229 N.E.2d 211, 213, 282
N.Y.S.2d 526, 529 (1967).
I" E.g., People v. Brown, 48 N.Y.2d 388, 395, 399 N.E.2d 51, 54, 423 N.Y.S.2d 461, 464
(1979); People v. Crimmins, 26 N.Y.2d 319, 323, 258 N.E.2d 708, 710, 310 N.Y.S.2d 300, 302
(1970); see U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment of the federal constitution states,
in pertinent part, that "fin all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury ... [and] to be confronted with the witnesses
against him ...
." Id.; see United States v. Beach, 296 F.2d 153, 160 (4th Cir. 1961).
Overt acts of a juror may be the subject of inquiry if"'they are accessible to the knowledge of all the jurors ....
"' Id. (quoting Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 415, 419 (1874)). It has
been contended, however, that a distinction should be drawn between the conduct of jurors
during the course of deliberations, whether inside or outside the jury room, and "influences
which are called into play by outside forces and which are extraneous to their deliberations." People v. De Lucia, 20 N.Y.2d 275, 282, 229 N.E.2d 211, 216, 282 N.Y.S.2d 526, 532
(1967) (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, although inquiry into the mental process
employed by a juror in arriving at his conclusion is prohibited, FED. R. EvD. 606(b); see
Mueller, supra note 163, at 936-940 nn.64-86, both the federal rules and the proposed New
York rules of evidence permit a juror to testify regarding any outside influence "improperly
brought to bear upon any juror," FED. R. Evw. 606(b); NEw YORK PROPOSED CODE OF EviDENCE 606(b); see Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149 (1892). For example, the Supreme Court, considering the prejudicial effect of a newspaper article read to the jury by a
bailiff, observed that juror testimony regarding "any extraneous influence" is admissible as
long as inquiry is not made "as to how far that influence operated upon his mind." Id.; see
Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364-65 (1966). The Court held, therefore, that the bailiff's
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that a juror's conduct revealed material evidence that was not produced at trial. 165 Recently, however, in People v. Smith,16 6 the Appellate Division, First Department held that a verdict is not
tainted if a juror draws upon everyday observations made during
deliberations, notwithstanding that his observations "were material to an issue at trial and apparently colored his views."'" 7
In Smith, several police officers observed the defendant and
his companions hurriedly entering a "gypsy" cab in a high crime
area. 68 The officers later testified that, after they had pulled their
unmarked car behind the taxicab, they noticed the defendant sitting in the back seat of the cab brandishing a gun.16 9 In order to
assess the officers' credibility, a juror, at various times during the
course of jury deliberations, looked into the rear windows of
comment on the guilt of the defendant constituted an outside influence on the jury that
violated the criminal defendant's sixth amendment rights. Mattox, 146 U.S. at 149. For
other examples of outside influences that have been held to be prejudicial, see Rideau v.
Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 731-33 (1963) (television broadcast of the filmed interrogation of
defendant); People v. Durling, 303 N.Y. 382, 384-85, 103 N.E.2d 336, 336-37 (1952) (communication by jurors with prosecution witnesses through open windows of juryroom); People v.
Marrero, 83 App. Div. 2d 565, 565, 441 N.Y.S.2d 12, 13 (2d Dep't 1980) (discussion of evidence with alternate jurors); People v. Whitmore, 45 Misc. 2d 506, 515-20, 257 N.Y.S.2d 787,
799-809 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1965) (unfavorable media publicity creating a hostile environment), rev'd on other grounds, 27 App. Div. 2d 939, 278 N.Y.S.2d 706 (2d Dep't 1967). It
is interesting to note that the Court of Appeals has permitted impeachment of a verdict on
the theory that the ethnic prejudice exhibited in a juror's statements made him ineligible to
be a juror in the first instance and, thus, his vote was a nullity. People v. Leonti, 262 N.Y.
256, 258, 186 N.E. 693, 694 (1933). Such a broad approach appears to circumvent any consideration of the sixth amendment issue.
165See People v. Brown, 48 N.Y.2d 388, 395, 399 N.E.2d 51, 54, 423 N.Y.S.2d 461, 464
(1979); Mueller, supra note 163, at 944-46 nn.100-108; see also Durr v. Cook, 589 F.2d 891,
893 (5th Cir. 1979) (juror attempted to recreate events described in testimony); Gafford v.
Warden, 434 F.2d 318, 319-20 (10th Cir. 1970) (juror independently verified the closing time
of a late show and the business hours of a gas station); Stiles v. Lawrie, 211 F.2d 188, 189-90
(6th Cir. 1954) (driver's manual used by jurors in negligence case); People v. Crimmins, 26
N.Y.2d 319, 322-24, 258 N.E.2d 708, 709-10, 310 N.Y.S.2d 300, 301-02 (1970) (jurors made
an unauthorized visit to alleged crime scene); cf. People v. Harris, 84 App. Div. 2d 63, 10405, 445 N.Y.S.2d 520, 545-46 (2d Dep't 1981) (jurors were invited by both prosecution and
defense to conduct tests in the jury room that were designed to verify trial testimony).
16687 App. Div. 2d 357, 451 N.Y.S.2d 429 (1st Dep't 1982).
167 Id. at 361, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 432.
168Id. at 357-58, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 430.
169Id. at 358, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 430. The four officers observed the defendant, for various
periods of time, brandishing a silver-plated gun in his raised hand. Id. After pulling the
patrol car in front of the cab, all four officers alighted from the car and approached the cab.
Id. One of the officers, upon reaching the cab, noticed that the defendant was holding a gun.
Id. After the officer identified himself, the defendant dropped the gun on the floor of the
taxicab, and the officer retrieved it. Id.

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

1983]

cars. 17 0 Although this juror had voted for acquittal throughout the

first day of deliberations, he changed his position after making
such observations. Without a hearing, the trial court denied the
defendant's motion to set aside the verdict on the ground of juror
misconduct, concluding that the juror was merely drawing upon an
1 72
everyday experience to verify the police officers' testimony.
On appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department affirmed.1 7 Justice Sullivan, writing for the majority,1 7 4 initially ac-

knowledged that a verdict may be set aside on the ground of improper influence even if it is "well-intentioned juror conduct" that
introduces evidence not contained in the record.1 7 5 The court then

observed, however, that this juror's behavior should not be classified as a calculated and contrived test of the credibility of a witness, 7 but rather as a mere random observation typical of the
kind of everyday experience upon which a juror is expected to
draw. 177 Thus, Justice Sullivan reasoned, because the juror "saw
what every other juror could have seen," he did not become an
unsworn witness nor place otherwise inadmissible evidence before
the jury.17 8 The court reached this conclusion despite its recogni170 Id. at 359, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 431.
17
172

Id.
Id.

Id. at 361, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 432.
Justice Sullivan was joined by Presiding Justice Kupferman and Justice Markewich.
Justice Milonas filed a dissenting opinion.
175 87 App. Div. 2d at 360, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 431 (citing People v. Brown, 48 N.Y.2d 388,
393, 399 N.E.2d 51, 53, 423 N.Y.S.2d 461, 463 (1979)).
176 87 App. Div. 2d at 361, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 432; see People v. Brown, 48 N.Y.2d 388,
395, 399 N.E.2d 51, 54, 423 N.Y.S.2d 461, 464 (1979). In Brown, a police detective testified
that he identified the defendant by looking through the passenger side window of a police
van into the driver's side of the adjacent car. Id. at 391, 399 N.E.2d at 52, 423 N.Y.S.2d at
462. During the trial, a juror conducted a "test," using her own van, in order to verify the
detective's testimony, and she reported her findings to the jury. Id. at 392, 399 N.E.2d at 52,
423 N.Y.S.2d at 462-63.
177 87 App. Div. 2d at 361, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 432. Justice Sullivan noted that jurors constantly are exposed to stimuli that "affect the perspective from which they view the world."
Id.; see People v. Brown, 48 N.Y.2d 388, 393, 399 N.E.2d 51, 53, 423 N.Y.S.2d 461, 463
(1979). Judge Wachtler, writing for the majority in Brown, recognized that jurors "do not
live in capsules" and are not expected to "cripple their cognitive functions." Id. Indeed, the
Brown court stated that "the application of a lay jury's collective intelligence and experience [in] ... sifting evidence and reaching a verdict is regarded as a hallmark of our juridical system." Id.; cf. C. McCORMICK, supranote 163, § 329, at 762 ("[j]ury may consider, as if
proven, facts within the common knowledge of the community"). See generally R. McBR DE, THE ART OF INSTRUCTING THE JURY § 3.13, at 69 (1969); 1 J. DowsEy, CHARGES TO THE
173
174

JURY AND REQUESTS TO CHARGE IN A CIMINA
178 87

CASE § 2, at 6 (1968).

App. Div. 2d at 361, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 432.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:389

tion of the material impression that the observations made upon
1 9
the juror. 7
Dissenting in part, Justice Milonas noted that the juror's conduct conceivably did not involve an "'application of everyday experience.' "1o Additionally, the dissent contended, a substantial
risk of prejudice might exist even if only one juror is swayed by the
unauthorized test. 181 Justice Milonas stated, therefore, that in view
of these circumstances, the defendant was entitled to a hearing to
discern the precise character of the juror's conduct.18 2
It is submitted that the analysis employed by the Smith court
is inconsistent with the established method of examining juror
misconduct. In People v. Brown,1 83 the Court of Appeals enunciated a three-prong test to be applied in determining whether juror
misconduct gives rise to reversible error. It appears, however, that
the Smith panel misinterpreted the Brown standard by focusing
upon the commonplace character of the juror's conduct,18 4 rather
than upon the resultant prejudice to the defendant. 8 5 The unexId.; see supra text accompanying note 167.
87 App. Div. 2d at 363, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 433 (Milonas, J., dissenting).
181 Id.
(Milonas, J., dissenting).
182 Id. (Milonas, J., dissenting).
18 48 N.Y.2d 388, 399 N.E.2d 51, 423 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1979); see supra note 176. In
Brown, a police officer testified that, immediately prior to a robbery, he observed the defendant driving what later turned out to be the getaway car. 48 N.Y.2d at 391, 399 N.E.2d at
52, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 462. During the trial, a juror, who owned a Volkswagen van, tested the
range of visibility from its passenger seat. Id. at 392, 399 N.E.2d at 52, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
Before a verdict was reached, she told the other jurors that the officer may, indeed, have
seen the defendant's face from his position in the van. Id. Reversing the defendant's conviction, the Court of Appeals, enunciating a three-part test to assess juror misconduct, stated
that the juror's conduct was a "conscious, contrived experimentation," that "the 'test' was
directly material to a point at issue in the trial," and that there was "a substantial risk of
prejudice to the rights of the defendant by coloring the views of the other jurors as well as
her own." Id. at 394, 399 N.E.2d at 53-54, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 463-64.
In situations where it is "simply impossible to determine the extent to which [a constitutional] error damaged the defendant's chances for acquittal," one commentator views the
error inherently prejudicial and as requiring automatic reversal. Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of Chapman v. California, 53 MINN. L. REv. 519, 541 (1969).
This conclusion is based upon the rule that an appellate court must be convinced that a
constitutional error is "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18, 24 (1966). With respect to juror misconduct, the Court of Appeals has classified
only unauthorized visits to the crime scene as "inherently prejudicial." See People v. Crimmins, 26 N.Y.2d 319, 323, 258 N.E.2d 708, 710, 310 N.Y.S.2d 300, 302 (1970). But cf. Alford
v. Sventek, 53 N.Y.2d 743, 745, 421 N.E.2d 831, 833, 439 N.Y.S.2d 339, 341 (1981) (authorized visit and test by juror not inherently prejudicial in civil case).
See People v. Smith, 87 App. Div. 2d at 361, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 432; supra note 177.
188 See United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865, 869 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Allison, 481 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 982 (1974); Simon v. Kuhl178
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ceptional nature of the juror's conduct is merely one factor to be
considered in determining the extent of prejudice, and not a
threshold inquiry that forecloses evaluation of the remaining
factors.""
The Smith scenario, it is further suggested, presents a deceptively mundane example of juror misconduct. Although this particular juror apparently was well intentioned, his conduct may have
substantially prejudiced the sixth amendment rights of the defendant. 187 Such a consequence, together with the traditional reluctance of the judiciary to examine juror conduct,' suggests that a
preventive approach to the problem of juror misconduct would be
prudent. Thus, just as jurors are instructed specifically neither to
visit the scene of a crime nor to read outside accounts of the
man, 488 F. Supp. 59, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); People v. Brown, 48 N.Y.2d 388, 394-95, 399
N.E.2d 51, 53-54, 423 N.Y.S.2d 461, 463-65 (1979).
198 See People v. Brown, 48 N.Y.2d 388, 393-94, 399 N.E.2d 51, 53-54, 423 N.Y.S.2d
461, 463-64 (1979). In Brown, the Court examined the nature of the juror's conduct, its
materiality to the issues at trial, and the resulting risk of prejudice to the defendant, see
supra note 183 and accompanying text, in order to assess the extent of prejudice suffered by
the defendant. See 48 N.Y.2d at 393-95, 399 N.E.2d at 53-54, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 463-64. It
appears, however, that the Brown Court classified the factor relating to the nature of the
juror's conduct neither as a threshold consideration nor as the critical inquiry in juror misconduct cases.
187 Cf. CPL § 330.30(2) (1971). Section 330.30 provides that a verdict may be set aside
or modified if
(2) during the trial there occurred, out of the presence of the court, improper
conduct by a juror, or improper conduct by another person in relation to a juror,
which may have affected a substantial right of the defendant and which was not
known to the defendant prior to the rendition of the verdict.
Id. But cf. United States ex rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813, 816-17 (2d Cir. 1970)
(since it is impossible to insulate the jury from "external factors," it is meaningless to label
a juror an unsworn witness once he "passes a fraction of an inch beyond the record evidence"), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971). Notably, it has been stated that a juror's experiment is harmless only when evidence of the defendant's guilt is overwhelming. See United
States v. Welch, 377 F. Supp. 367, 369 (D.S.C. 1973), aff'd, 496 F.2d 861 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 857 (1974); see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1967) (even
with strong circumstantial evidence against the defendant, the Court could not conclude,
absent the particular prejudicial error, that the jury would have found the defendant guilty).
In this regard it is significant to note that in New York, the vote of one juror is critical, since
a unanimous verdict is necessary to convict a criminal defendant. See People v. Light, 285
App. Div. 496, 497, 138 N.Y.S.2d 262, 264 (4th Dep't 1955); People v. Sanabria, 42 Misc. 2d
464, 469, 249 N.Y.S.2d 66, 71 (1st Dep't 1964); CPL § 310.80 (1971).
88 See supra note 163 and accompanying text. But see Simon v. Kulhman, 488 F.
Supp. 59, 67-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (evidentiary hearings should be conducted to ascertain the
nature and extent of juror experiments); People v. De Lucia, 20 N.Y.2d 275, 280, 229 N.E.2d
211, 214, 282 N.Y.S.2d 526, 530 (1967) (case remanded to establish the actual occurrence of
a juror visit to the crime scene).
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trial,189 so too should they be admonished to refrain from independent experimentation that might affect, in any way, their perception of material issues.
Brenda Eng Hom

Plaintiff's failure to use available seatbelt may be considered as
evidence of contributory negligence when the nonuse allegedly
causes the accident
Three general approaches have been developed to determine
the effect that nonuse of an available seatbelt has upon a plaintiff's
recovery in an action for personal injuries suffered in a motor vehicle accident.9e New York has taken the position that although
189 CPL § 270.40 (1971). Section 270.40 mandates that preliminary instructions relating
to jury misconduct be given to the jury. Id. The statute provides that
[s]uch instructions must include, among other matters, admonitions that the jurors may not converse among themselves or with anyone else upon any subject
connected with the trial; that they may not read or listen to any accounts or discussions of the case reported by newspapers or other news media; that they may
not visit or view the premises or the place where the offense or the offenses
charged were allegedly committed or any other premises or place involved in the
case; and that they must promptly report to the court any incident within their
knowledge involving an attempt by any person improperly to influence any member of the jury.
Id. It is suggested that the statute be amended to include express references to independent
juror experimentation and juror conduct that reasonably may bear upon material issues.
190 Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 450, 323 N.E.2d 164, 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 920
(1974). One of the three approaches to the seatbelt defense is the negligence per se approach, which posits that in a personal injury action arising out of an automobile accident,
in a jurisdiction that has enacted a seatbelt installation statute, the plaintiff who failed to
use a seatbelt will be considered contributorily negligent as a matter of law. See Comment,
The Seat Belt Defense: A New Approach, 38 FORDHAM L. Rav. 94, 97 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Fordham Comment]; Comment, The Seat Belt Defense-A Valid Instrument of
Public Policy, 44 TENN. L. REv. 119, 122 (1976). Notably, no jurisdiction has accepted the
negligence per se approach, see, e.g., Remington v. Arndt, 28 Conn. Supp. 289, 291, 259 A.2d
145, 146 (Super. Ct. 1969); Cierpisz v. Singleton, 247 Md. 215, 227, 230 A.2d 629, 635 (1967);
Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 230, 160 S.E.2d 65, 68 (1968), since there exists no installation statute which mandates that seatbelts be worn, Comment, supra, at 122 & n.16; see
N.Y. VEH. & TRAM. LAW § 383 (McKinney 1970) (requires that seatbelts be installed in every
automobile manufactured after 1967, but does not require their use).
Another approach to the seatbelt defense is common-law contributory negligence, which
is premised upon the belief that a reasonably prudent automobile occupant would exercise
reasonable care for his own safety, and thus would use an available seatbelt. See Fordham
Comment, supra, at 97. The contributory negligence approach has been adopted by a small
number of jurisdictions. See, e.g., Harlan v. Curbo, 250 Ark. 610, 612, 466 S.W.2d 459, 46061 (1971); Truman v. Vargas, 275 Cal. App. 2d 976, 981, 80 Cal. Rptr. 373, 377 (Ct. App.
1969); Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 385, 149 N.W.2d 626, 639 (1967). Of the courts

